Although organizational commitment continues to interest researchers because of its positive effects on organizations, we know relatively little about the effects of the ethical context on organizational commitment. As such, we contribute to the organizational commitment field by assessing the effects of ethical climates (Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988) on organizational commitment. We hypothesized that an ethical climate of benevolence has a positive relationship with organizational commitment while egoistic climate is negatively related to commitment. Results supported our propositions for both (...) a benevolent climate and an egoistic climate. We also hypothesized that a principled climate is positively related to organizational commitment for professional workers but has no relationships for nonprofessional workers. Results supported this hypothesis. (shrink)

Laboratory ethnographies have provided valuable insights in the workings of contemporary science and technology and about facts in the making. Nearly all these ethnographic studies have been conducted at nonprofit research institutes. In this article, the authors argue that it is time for science and technology studies (STS) ethnography to direct its gaze toward for-profit knowledge production sites. The authors do so, based on a long-standing recognition that nonprofit academic laboratories do not have a monopoly on knowledge construction. First, they (...) historicize STS’ focus on public knowledge production, distinguishing between two roles for STS. Second, they argue that relationships between industry and society have changed, resulting in increasing corporate transparency. Third, they argue that this change enables STS ethnography to enter corporations and corporate laboratories. The authors conclude by proposing a research agenda for the social study of corporate science. (shrink)

One of the most enduring criticisms of John Dewey's political thought is that it is unsuspicious of power. This essay responds to this critique by advancing the claim that power is an integral but implicit element of Dewey's conception of human experience. Given Dewey's indirect treatment of power, this essay has two primary tasks. First, it reconstructs and develops an explicit conception of power for Deweyan pragmatism. Second, it evaluates the extent that Dewey's political and social philosophy is able to (...) criticize power relations. Taken together, I aim to provide a more coherent and realistic defense of the political dimensions of Dewey's democratic theory. This defense moves Deweyan pragmatism toward a democratic politics that neither elides conflict nor evades power. (shrink)

Personal data use is increasingly permeating our everyday life. Informed consent for personal data use is a central instrument for ensuring the protection of personal data. However, current informed consent practices often fail to actually inform data subjects about the use of personal data. This article presents the results of a requirements analysis for informed consent from both a legal and usability perspective, considering the application context of educational assessment. The requirements analysis is based on European Union law and a (...) review of current practices. As the main outcome, the article presents a blueprint which will be the basis for the development of an informed consent template that supports data controllers in establishing an effective and efficient informed consent form. Because the blueprint, and subsequently, the template, distinguishes between legal and usability requirements, it also provides the basis for the mapping of legal requirements in other contexts. (shrink)

Henry Sidgwick was one of the great intellectual figures of nineteenth-century Britain. He was first and foremost a great moral philosopher, whose masterwork The Methods of Ethics is still widely studied today. He also wrote on economics, politics, education and literature. He was deeply involved in the founding of the first college for women at the University of Cambridge. He was also much concerned with the sexual politics of his close friend John Addington Symonds, a pioneer of gay studies. Through (...) his famous student, G. E. Moore, a direct line can be traced from Sidgwick and his circle to the Bloomsbury group. Bart Schultz has written a magisterial overview of this great Victorian sage. This biography will be eagerly sought out by readers interested in philosophy, Victorian literary studies, the history of ideas, the history of psychology and gender and gay studies. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge is experimental knowledge. Such knowledge can be seen as "forbidden," either because the experiments leading to that knowledge are seen as immoral, or because interventions made possible by that knowledge could be morally offensive. There is currently an interesting case in the realm of genetic engineering, in which moral condemnations have been forthcoming but have not been unanimous. Here I present an analysis of this heterogeneity of moral assessment in the hope that this study of a single case (...) might be helpful for the discussion of bioethical generalizations around the category of the "forbidden.". (shrink)

Academic misconduct distorts the relationship between scientific practice and the knowledge it produces. The relationship between science and the knowledge it produces is, however, not something universally agreed upon. In this paper I will critically discuss the moral status of an act of research misconduct, namely plagiarism, in the context of different epistemological positions. While from a positivist view of science, plagiarism only influences trust in science but not the content of the scientific corpus, from a constructivist point of view (...) both are at stake. Consequently, I argue that discussions of research misconduct and responsible research ought to be explicitly informed by the authors’ views on the relationship between science and the knowledge it produces. (shrink)

Definition of the problemFrom an ethical point of view we analyse the ruling of the German Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, G‑BA) of September 2019 to revise the guidelines about the coverage of noninvasive prenatal tests (NIPT) by mandatory health insurance, in order to include them under specified conditions. The decision contains four essential elements: a definition of the aim of NIPT testing (to avoid invasive testing), a criterion of access (test must be “necessary” for the pregnant woman to tackle (...) her individual situation), statements about the process of decision-making (after counselling by a physician and case by case) and a normative contextualization (termination of pregnancy under § 218 a German penal law) which is to be found in its explanations. There are tensions in the proposed model that oscillate about two axes: (1) The suffering that results from a possible birth of a child with trisomy or from not knowing about the genetic condition of the fetus can ultimately only be evaluated subjectively, from the perspective of the pregnant woman. (2) The meaning of an individual decision in the case-by-case model remains unclear because when judging about individual cases general points of view also need to be considered. However, we argue that the model of the G‑BA could be a sociopolitically and ultimately also ethically defensible pragmatic solution, exactly because of its paradoxes and its inherent flexibility. (shrink)

In this paper, a reaction is presented to Siegel’s claim that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation ignores or neglects epistemological viewpoints that he finds vital to any normative theory of argumentation. The focus is on the most important problems in Siegel’s argument: 1) the ambiguity of the term ‘argument’ and the alleged negligence of this ambiguity in pragma-dialectics; 2) the critical rational perspective of the pragma-dialectical account; and 3) the alleged negligence of the “abstract propositional sense” of argument in pragma-dialectics.

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the (...) theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. -/- He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it. (shrink)

Die breite Einführung nicht-invasiver pränataler Tests sowie die Ausweitung der Testziele über Trisomien hinaus machen es notwendig, Sinn und Ziel der pränatalen Diagnostik als emergente soziale Praxis grundsätzlich zu diskutieren. Wenn, wie angenommen wird, PND nicht zu eugenischen Zwecken, sondern zur Stärkung der Autonomie dienen soll, muss gefragt werden, welche Bedeutung die Entscheidungen haben, ein bestimmtes zukünftiges Kind zu gebären. Stephen Wilkinson hat vorgeschlagen, PND als eine Form „selektiver Reproduktion“ zu verstehen. In diesem Paper wird geprüft, ob die Charakterisierung der (...) Entscheidung nach PND als „Selektion“ zutrifft und welche moralischen Vorannahmen ihr zugrunde liegen.Es zeigt sich, dass das Konzept der „selektiven Reproduktion“ die Handlungen der PND inakkurat repräsentiert. Es beinhaltet zudem sowohl eine Abstrahierung als auch eine Distanzierung. Es nimmt an, dass Frauen und Paare entweder falls nötig mehrere Schwangerschaften planen, um ein gesundes Kind zu erzeugen, oder sich als Ausführende einer selektiven Strategie auf der Populationsebene verstehen. Die Einschränkung der ethischen Diskussion auf das Problem der Selektion verdeckt zwei wichtige Problemfelder, die die konflikthaltige Situation der PND aus der Perspektive der Frau oder des Paares charakterisieren: die Schwangerschaft als persönliche Beziehung und den Akt des Abbruchs der Schwangerschaft. Aufgrund seiner impliziten Normativität wird „selektive Fortpflanzung“ als sinnvolle Bezeichnung für die Praxis der PND zurückgewiesen. (shrink)

Patients at the end of their life who express a wish to die sometimes explain their wish as the desire not to be a burden to others. This feeling needs to be investigated as an emotion with an intrinsically dialogical structure. Using a phenomenological approach, two key meanings of the feeling of being a burden to others as a reason for a wish to die are identified. First, it is an existential suffering insofar as it contains the perception of a (...) plight so desperate that it can only be relieved by the end of the patient’s existence. Second, it is an empathic concern that implies caring about those who bear the burden of caring for the person at the end of their life. It is therefore a moral emotion, encompassing a series of difficulties, including the subjective perception of a stark imbalance between giving and taking, the adequacy of the representation of the caregiver burden in the patient’s mind, and the danger of diminishing the worth of one’s life out of shame or self‐denigration. R. D. Laing’s terminology of crossed perspectives in interexperience is used to systematically distinguish the actual caregiver burden, the patient’s view of the caregiver burden, the stress for the patient in feeling that s/he is a burden to the caregiver, and the caregiver’s view of the patient’s stress. The sense of being a burden implies the belief that the caregiver feels burdened, and the fear that this burden could become unbearable. (shrink)

Health-promoting nudges have been put into practice by different agents, in different contexts and with different aims. This article formulates a set of criteria that enables a thorough ethical evaluation of such nudges. As such, it bridges the gap between the abstract, theoretical debates among academics and the actual behavioral interventions being implemented in practice. The criteria are derived from arguments against nudges, which allegedly disrespect nudgees, as these would impose values on nudgees and/or violate their rationality and autonomy. Instead (...) of interpreting these objections as knock-down arguments, I take them as expressing legitimate worries that can often be addressed. I analyze six prototypical nudge cases, such as Google’s rearrangement of fridges and the use of defaults in organ donation registration. I show how the ethical criteria listed are satisfied by most—but not all—nudges in most—but not all—circumstances. (shrink)

The legal basis for processing personal data and some other types of Big Data is often the informed consent of the data subject involved. Many data controllers, such as social network sites, offer terms and conditions, privacy policies or similar documents to which a user can consent when registering as a user. There are many issues with such informed consent: people get too many consent requests to read everything, policy documents are often very long and difficult to understand and users (...) feel they do not have a real choice anyway. Furthermore, in the context of Big Data refusing consent may not prevent predicting missing data. Finally, consent is usually asked for when registering, but rarely is consent renewed. As a result, consenting once often implies consent forever. At the same time, given the rapid changes in Big Data and data analysis, consent may easily get outdated. This paper suggests expiry dates for consent, not to settle questions, but to put them on the table as a start for further discussion on this topic. Although such expiry dates may not solve all the issues of informed consent, they may be a useful tool in some situations. (shrink)

Was kann die ‚dritte‘ Geschlechtsoption jenseits von ‚weiblich‘ und ‚männlich‘ bedeuten? Auf der Grundlage der Entscheidung des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts von 2017, welche die explizite Anerkennung einer dritten Geschlechtskategorie ‚divers‘ forderte, diskutiert dieser Beitrag die soziale Funktion von nichtbinären Geschlechtskategorien. Es argumentiert, dass die dritte Option nicht nur ein negativer Begriff ist, der beide traditionellen Geschlechter verneint. Sie muss auch als positive Kategorie (oder als Familie von Kategorien) gedacht werden, welche über eine Identifikation mit der Freiheit von traditionellen Geschlechtsidentitäten und Geschlechternormen (...) gebildet ist. Die Kategorie ‚divers‘ kann deshalb keine einheitliche Identifikationskategorie sein. ‚Divers‘ soll vielmehr selbst als eine in sich diverse Kategorie gedacht werden – als ein offener Möglichkeitsraum. Wie weit kann aber die Diversifizierung der Geschlechtsidentität gehen? Der Beitrag argumentiert für eine kategorielle Pluralität der Geschlechtsanerkennung. Diese Position beinhaltet zwei Aussagen: (a) Die soziale, intersubjektive Geschlechteranerkennung braucht in der Tat Kategorien; eine vollständige Individualisierung von Geschlecht auch in dem Bereich ‚inter‘ ist nicht möglich und wäre auch nicht wünschbar. (b) Gesellschaften sollten es zulassen, dass die Geschlechtermatrix dynamisch erweitert wird, über nur zwei (oder nur drei) Kategorien hinaus. Die Gründe für diese Position werden in drei Schritten erklärt: (i) Die Pluralität von Geschlechtsidentitäten innerhalb des dritten Raumes ist eine soziale Tatsache, die zuerst einmal anerkannt werden muss. (ii) Pluralität innerhalb der dritten Geschlechtskategorie ist ethisch erforderlich, weil andere in sozialen Beziehungen ein Recht darauf haben, darüber anerkannt zu werden, als was sie gesehen werden wollen. Dieses Argument ergibt sich aus einer Rekonstruktion von Emmanuel Lévinas’ phänomenologische Ethik der Intersubjektivität. (iii) Aus der Dekonstruktion von Geschlechtsidentitäten in Werken von Judith Butler, Gundula Ludwig und Finn Mackay ist zu lernen, dass Geschlechtsidentitäten eine soziale Funktion haben: Sie machen Subjekte intelligibel, d. h. sie ermöglichen es anderen, sie zu ‚lesen‘. Deshalb müssen Geschlechtsidentitäten dem Leben des Individuums in Varianten auch vorgängig anerkannt sein und sie müssen eine Gemeinsamkeit für eine Mehrzahl von Menschen konstituieren. (shrink)

'Tu m'as déçu!' Qui, aujourd'hui, pourrait se relever d'une telle accusation? Et qui, aussi, n'y a jamais recouru? Nous sommes les êtres de la déception, car nous ne cessons de décevoir et d'être déçu. Pourtant, les moralistes l'ont martelé : être déçu, c'est avant tout être la victime d'attentes qui n'existaient que dans notre tête. Mais si ce n'était pas tout? Et si, derrière la fable morale, se dissimulait toute une politique, une théologie et même une métaphysique? Et si, derrière (...) la danse de l'espoir et de la déception, des attentes et de leur frustration, se déployait un véritable ordre du monde, décidant, pour nous, de ce que nous pouvons et ne pouvons pas? Et si décevoir était avant tout une manière de s'y soustraire? Poursuivant son travail de décadrage des grands concepts issus de la modernité, Laurent de Sutter ajoute un chapitre jouissif au chantier de ses Propositions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)